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Preferences may arise from regret, i.e., from comparisons with alternatives for-
gone by the decision maker. We ask whether regret-based behavior is consistent
with nonexpected utility theories of transitive choice and show that the answer
is no. If choices are governed by ex ante regret and rejoicing, then nonexpected
utility preferences must be intransitive.




ence relation over sets of options and these preferences are assumed to be independent
of the environment. There are, however, good reasons to challenge this assumption.
Preferences may depend on the decision maker’s holding (reference point), on other
people’s holdings (envy), or on the choice set itself.
One such model is regret theory (Bell 1982 and Loomes and Sugden 1982). Accord-
ing to this theory the decision maker anticipates his future feelings about the choice he
is about to make and acts according to these feelings. This approach is natural when
the decision maker has to choose between two (or more) random variables. Once the
uncertainty is resolved, he will know what outcome he received, but also what outcome
he could have received had he chosen an alternative option. This comparison may lead
to rejoicing—if his actual outcome is better than the alternative—or regret.
Formally, let X and Y be two random variables with money outcomes. Let ψ(x y)
measure the regret or rejoicing a person feels when observing that he won x while the
alternative choice would have landed him y. Choosing X over Y thus leads, ex ante, to a
lottery  (X Y) where the outcomes are ψ(x y). Choice is based on regret and rejoicing
if there is a functional V over regret/rejoice lotteries such that X is chosen over Y if and
only if V(   ( X  Y) )>0.
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The question we ask is simple: What functionals V and regret/rejoice functions ψ
are consistent with transitive choice? That is, when is it true that if V(   ( X  Y) )>0 and
V(   ( Y  Z) )>0,t h e nV(   ( X  Z) )>0 as well? If regret is separable across events, that
is, if V(   ( X  Y) )=
 
iVi(ψ(xi yi) si), then the possibility of having a violation of tran-
sitivity is well known (see Bell 1982, Loomes and Sugden 1982,a n dFishburn 1989). In
fact,inthatcase,violationsoftransitivitymust beobservedunless ψ(x y) = u(x)−u(y),
which means that the original preferences are expected utility.1 The main result of our
paper is that regret-based transitive choice implies expected utility and this conclusion
does not depend on V being linear in probabilities or even separable across states.
To see why this result is not obvious, consider the following intuition. For equiprob-
able partition S1     Sn, transitivity implies that for any vector of outcomes (x1     xn)
and any permutation π of {1     n},
(x1 S1;   ;xn Sn) ∼ (xπ(1) S1;   ;xπ(n) Sn)
(see Proposition 1 below). Separability of V implies that the regret evaluation of
(xi xπ(i)) in event Si does not depend on what happens in event Sj, j  = i. Therefore, any
regret pair (x y) can be evaluated through a lottery and its permutation as above. With-
out separability this cannot be done, as the evaluation of the regret pair (x y) depends
on the rest of the lottery.
One can read the result of the paper in two different ways. It offers a necessary and
sufﬁcientconditionforafunctionaltobeexpectedutilitywithoutmakinganyreferences
to mixture spaces (see Kreps 1988 for summary of terms and basic results). But the real
contributionistheimpossibilityresultthatshowsthatregretisinherentlyintransitive. If
so, then one must either conclude that (i) regret, despite its clear psychological appeal,
cannot be used in standard economic models; (ii) models of regret that are richer than
in Bell (1982)a n dLoomes and Sugden (1982) are necessary—for example, as is done
in Sarver (2008) or by deﬁning regret with respect to foregone distributions rather than
foregone outcomes (see Machina 1987 and Starmer 2000 for some steps in this direc-
tion); (iii) models of intransitive preferences must be incorporated into economics as in
Fishburn and LaValle (1988), Loomes and Sugden (1987), or Hayashi (2008).2
The paper is organized as follows. The model and the main result are presented in
the next section. Section 3 offers an outline of the proof, while the details of the proof
appear in the Appendix.
2. The model and main result
Let L be the set of real ﬁnite-valued random variables over (S   P) with S =[ 0 1],  
being the standard Borel σ algebra on S,P= μ being the Lebesgue measure, and the
set of outcomes being the bounded interval [
¯
x  ¯ x]. The decision maker has a preference
relation   over L. In the sequel, we denote events by Si and Ti.
1For this observation, see Sugden (2004, p. 739). We offer a formal proof of this claim in Lemma 7 below
as we are not aware of one in the literature.
2See also Starmer (2000) for further references.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Transitive regret 97
Definition 1. The continuous function ψ:[
¯
x  ¯ x]×[
¯
x  ¯ x]→ is a regret function if for
all x, ψ(x x) = 0, ψ(x y) is strictly increasing in x and strictly decreasing in y.
If in some event X yields x and Y yields y,t h e nψ(x y) is a measure of the decision
maker’s ex post feelings (of regret if x<yor rejoicing if x>y) about the choice of X
over Y. This leads to the next deﬁnition.
Definition 2. Let X Y ∈ L,w h e r eX = (x1 S1;   ;xn Sn) and Y = (y1 S1;   ;yn Sn).
The regret lottery evaluating the choice of X over Y is
 (X Y) = (ψ(x1 y1) p1;   ;ψ(xn yn) pn) 
where pi = P(Si), i = 1     n. Denote the set of regret lotteries by R ={  (X Y) :
X Y ∈ L}.
For brevity we refer to ψ and   as regret function and regret lottery, respectively,
even though they encompass both regret and rejoicing.
Definition 3. The preference relation   is regret based if there is a regret function ψ
and a continuous functional V that is deﬁned over regret lotteries such that for any
X Y ∈ L,
X   Y if and only if V(   ( X  Y) )≥ 0 
The main result of this paper is the following.
Theorem 1. Let   be a complete, transitive, continuous, and monotonic preference re-
lation over the set L of random variables. The relation   is regret based if and only if it is
expected utility.
This theorem implies, in particular, the known result that the regret models of Bell
(1982), Loomes and Sugden (1982), and Sugden (1993) are intransitive.3 We take this
result a step further and show that this intransitivity is not caused by separability across
events, but is the result of regret itself.4
Recently, Sarver (2008)presentedanonexpectedutilitymodelofregretthatistransi-
tive,butitdepartsfromthestandardregretmodelofBell(1982)andLoomesandSugden
(1982). In Sarver’s model, the decision maker chooses between menus of lotteries and
a lottery from the selected menu. At the time these two choices are made, the decision
maker is uncertain about the utility of different outcomes. Later, after uncertainty is
3An important exception is the case where the choice set consists of statistically independent random
variables, and for the two lotteries (x1 p1;   ;xn pn) and (y1 q1;   ;ym qm), the probability of the regret
ψ(xi yj) is piqj (see Machina 1987, pp. 138–140 and Starmer 2000, pp. 355–356). For example, Hong (1983)
weighted utility theory is consistent with this form of regret.
4Gul’s (1991) model of disappointment is transitive and nonexpected utility. The comparison in this
model is between the outcome of a lottery and the lottery itself, rather than between possible outcomes of
a pair of lotteries.98 Bikhchandani and Segal Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
resolved, the decision maker may experience ex post regret if the selected lottery turns
out to be inferior to another lottery that is also in the menu he selected. This induces
a transitive, nonexpected utility preference relation over menus of lotteries in the initial
period. However, this is not inconsistent with Theorem 1. First, if menus are single-
tons, then Sarver’s model reduces to expected utility. Second, the source of uncertainty
is different. In our model, the decision maker does not know which state of nature will
hold and, therefore, he does not know what outcome he will receive. In Sarver’s model,
the decision maker does not know his future preferences and regret may emerge from
realizing that given his (now) known preferences, he chose the wrong option.
Theorem 1 is proved as follows. It is well known that expected utility is regret based
(with ψ(x y) = u(x)−u(y) andV(   ( X  Y) )=
 
ipiψ(xi yi)). Thatanytransitiveregret-
based preferences must be expected utility is proved in a sequence of steps summarized
below.
Step 1. Preferences satisfy the equivalence condition (Loomes and Sugden 1982,
p. 818). That is, if X and Y have the same distribution, then X ∼ Y (Section 3.1,
Proposition 1).
Step 2. The indifference curve of V through zero, {R:V( R )= 0}, is linear in probabili-
ties (Section 3.3, Lemmas 3–5).
Step 3. There exists V as in Deﬁnition 3 that is linear in probabilities for all regret lot-
teries R (Section 3.4, Lemma 6).
Step 4. The preference relation   is expected utility (Section 3.4, Lemma 7).
3. Proof of the theorem
3.1 Probabilistic equivalence
Whenpreferencesareregretbased,thedecisionmakercaresaboutwhateventswillhap-
pen as this will tell him what are the alternative outcomes he could have received had
he chosen differently. When the decision maker learns that the number 4 on a die yields
$100under X and$150under Y,thefactthatthesetwooutcomesarelinkedtothesame
state of the world is important, but the state itself is not. Consequently, only the prob-
abilities of the underlying states are relevant for regret between X and Y.A s l o n g a s
the probability of the number 1 is the same as that of 4, it makes no difference whether
the regret ψ(100 150) is obtained when the number is 1 or 4. This is why regret lotteries
are evaluated with respect to their probabilities and not with respect to the generating
events.
Proposition 1 shows that this observation, together with transitivity, has a signiﬁ-
cant implication to the evaluation of random variables. To see this, consider a box with
n balls, numbered 1     n. Draw one ball at random, and let X = (x1 S1;   ;xn Sn),
where Si is the event “ball i is drawn.” Let π:{1     n}→{ 1     n} be a permutation
of the n numbers and let π(X) ≡ (xπ(1) S1;   ;xπ(n) Sn).I fX   π(X), then according
to the discussion in the last paragraph, it should also be the case that π(X)   π2(X),
π2(X)   π3(X),    , πn!−1(X)   πn!(X). By transitivity, we obtain that X   πn!(X) = X,
a contradiction.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Transitive regret 99
For X ∈ L,l e tFX be the distribution of X,t h a ti s ,FX(x) = P(X ≤ x).
Proposition 1 (Probabilistic equivalence). Let   be a continuous and transitive regret-
based preference relation over L. For any two random variables X Y ∈ L,i fFX = FY,
then X ∼ Y.
Loomes and Sugden (1987)a n dFishburn and LaValle (1988) use cycles as above to
justify violations of transitivity. In Fishburn and LaValle (1988), a fair die is rolled and
payments are made according to the number shown. Consider the random variables X1
and X2 = π(X1) given by
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6
X1 $1,000 $500 $600 $700 $800 $900
X2 $900 $1,000 $500 $600 $700 $800
Asinﬁveofsixcases X1 yields$100morethan X2, FishburnandLaVallesuggestthat
preferring X1 to X2 is natural. But of course, using such a permutation ﬁve more times
leads to a nontransitive cycle.
T h ec o n v e r s eo fProposition 1 is not true. As is demonstrated by the follow-
ing example, there are nontransitive regret-based preferences that satisfy probabilistic
equivalence.
Example 1. For two random variables X and Y, ﬁnd comonotonic X  and Y  with
the same distributions as X and Y. Formally, for X = (x1 S1;   ;xn Sn) and Y =
(y1 T1;   ;Ym Tm),ﬁ n dX  = (x 
1 E1;   ;x 
  E ) and Y  = (y 
1 E1;   ;y 
  E ) such that
x 
1 ≤···≤x 
 , y 
1 ≤···≤y 
 , FX = FX ,a n dFY = FY .O b s e r v e t h a t X  and Y  depend
on both X and Y. Deﬁne now X   Y if and only if V( X   Y ) ≥ 0,w h e r eV( X   Y ) =  
P(Ei)(x 
i −y 
i)3. In other words,   is regret based with respect to the probability distri-
bution functions. As such, it satisﬁes probabilistic equivalence.
Let P(E1) = P(E2) = P(E3) = 1
3. The random variables X, Y, Z are given by
E1 E2 E3
X 81 93 0
Y 92 02 8
Z 10 18 29
Clearly V( X  Y)= V( Y  Z)= V( Z X)= 6,h e n c eX   Y, Y   Z,b u tZ   X. ♦
3.2 Preliminary results
We assume that outcomes are in a ﬁnite interval [
¯




x  ¯ x) and ¯ r = ψ(¯ x 
¯
x).
By the continuity of the regret functional, −∞ <
¯
r<0 < ¯ r<∞.A sψ(x y) is continuous,
increasing in x, and decreasing in y, it follows that the set of regret lotteries R deﬁned in
Deﬁnition 2 is the set of ﬁnite-valued lotteries with outcomes in the interval [
¯
r  ¯ r].T h e
following monotonicity properties of V are inherited from the monotonicity of  .100 Bikhchandani and Segal Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
Lemma 1. Let R and R  be two distinct regret lotteries such that R dominates R  by ﬁrst-
order stochastic dominance (FOSD).
(i) If V( R )= 0,t h e nV( R  )<0.
(ii) If V( R  ) = 0,t h e nV( R )>0.
The next lemma permits a selection of regret lotteries that are skew symmetric in
regret and rejoicing.
Lemma 2. (i) If ψ(x y) = ψ(x  y ),t h e nψ(y x) = ψ(y  x ).
(ii) The equality ψ(x y) =− ψ(y x) is without loss of generality.
We will assume throughout that ψ(x y) =− ψ(y x) and that  (X Y) =−  (Y X) ≡
(−ψ(y1 x1) p1;   ;−ψ(yn xn) pn).M o r e o v e r ,
¯
r =−¯ r.
3.3 The indifference curve through zero is linear
A regret lottery R is generated by a permutation if there exists a random variable X =
(x1 S1;   ;xn Sn),P (Si) = 1/n, and a permutation π of X such that  (X π(X)) = R.
By Proposition 1,i fR is generated by a permutation, then V( R )= 0. The next lemma
shows that the subset of {R:V( R )= 0} that is generated by permutations is convex.
Lemma 3. If R and R  are generated by permutations, then so is 1
2R+ 1
2R .
As R and R  are generated by permutations, we have V( R )= V( R  ) = 0 and, by
Lemma 3, V(1
2R + 1
2R ) = 0. As is shown by the next example, one cannot guarantee
that every regret lottery R = (r1 1/n;   ;rn 1/n) such that V( R )= 0 is generated by a
permutation.
Example 2. Consider an expected value maximizer whose choice set consists of ran-
dom variables with prizes in the interval [−3 3]. This individual’s regret function is
ψ(x y) = x−y and he is indifferent between X and Y deﬁned below, where P(Si) = 0 2:
X = (3 S1;3 S2;−1 S3;−1 S4;−1 S5)
Y = (−3 S1;−3 S2;3 S3;3 S4;3 S5) 
As X ∼ Y, V(   ( X  Y) )= V( 6 0 2;6 0 2;−4 0 2;−4 0 2;−4 0 2) = 0. But there does not
exist a random variable ˆ Z with outcomes in the interval [−3 3] and a permutation π
such that  (X Y) =  ( ˆ Z π( ˆ Z)). To see why, observe that the rejoicing 6 must be gen-
erated by the outcomes −3 and 3. From outcome 3, only regret is possible, and as the
only regret level is −4, the outcome 3 must be paired with −1.F r o mo u t c o m e−1,o n e
cannot generate rejoicing 6 or have regret −4.5 ♦
5If, instead, we had assumed that the set of outcomes was (−∞ ∞), then any R = (r1 1/n;   ;rn 1/n)
such that V( R )= 0 would be generated by a permutation, leading to a simpler proof of Theorem 1.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Transitive regret 101
The problem is that the outcomes in X and Y are far apart. However, as is shown by
the next example, one can ﬁnd in Example 2 a random variable Z whose outcomes are
sufﬁciently close to both X and Y such that X ∼ Z ∼ Y, and the regret lotteries  (X Z)
and  (Z Y) are generated by permutations.
Example3. UsingthenotationofExample2,letZ = (0 S1;0 S2;1 S3;1 S4;1 S5).T h u s
 (X Z) =  (Z Y) = (3 0 2;3 0 2;−2 0 2;−2 0 2;−2 0 2) 
Deﬁne
ˆ Z = (3 S1;0 S2;−3 S3;−1 S4;1 S5)
π( ˆ Z)= (0 S1;−3 S2;−1 S3;1 S4;3 S5) 
Then  ( ˆ Z π( ˆ Z))=  (X Z) =  (Z Y). ♦
This idea is formalized below.
Lemma 4. Let X ∼ Y,w h e r eX = (x1 S1;   ;xn Sn), Y = (y1 S1;   ;yn Sn),a n d
P(Si) = 1/n. Then there is a sequence X = Z1 ∼ Z2 ∼ ··· ∼ Zk = Y such that for
every   = 1     k − 1, there is a regret lottery ˆ Z  and a permutation π  so that
 (Z  Z +1) =  ( ˆ Z  π ( ˆ Z )).
Thus, even if a regret lottery R = (r1 1/n;   ;rn 1/n)with V( R )= 0 is not generated
by a permutation, one can ﬁnd a sequence of random variables Z1 ∼···∼Zk such that
each  (Z  Z +1) is generated by a permutation and R =  (Z1 Zk). T h i si su s e dt o
prove that the set {R:V( R )= 0} is convex.
Lemma 5. If V( R )= V( R  ) = 0,t h e nV(1
2R+ 1
2R ) = 0.
3.4 V is linear in probabilities and   is expected utility
The following lemma establishes that all indifference curves of V are linear.
Lemma 6. (i) There is a function v:[−¯ r ¯ r]→ such that V( R )  0 if and only if
E[v(R)]   0.
(ii) Moreover, v is strictly increasing with v(0) = 0 and v(ψ(x y)) =− v(ψ(y x)) for all
x, y.
We now use the function v to create a function u on outcomes that will turn out to
be the von Neuman–Morgenstern utility claimed by Theorem 1.
Lemma 7. There exists an increasing function u:[
¯
x  ¯ x]→ such that
v(ψ(x y)) = u(x)−u(y) 102 Bikhchandani and Segal Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
From the last two lemmas, we have for X = (x1 S1;   ;xn Sn) and Y = (y1 S1;   ;
yn Sn),w h e r eP (Si) = pi,










w h i c hi st h ec l a i mo ft h et h e o r e m .
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.L e tX = (x1 S1;   ;xn Sn) and Y = (y1 S 
1;   ;yn S 
n) be
such that FX = FY.
Case 1. Si = S 
i and P(Si) = 1/n, i = 1     n. Then there is a permutation ˆ π such that
Y =ˆ π(X).O b v i o u s l y , (X  ˆ π(X)) =  (ˆ πi(X)  ˆ πi+1(X)). Hence, as there exists m ≤ n!
such that ˆ πm(X) = X, it follows by transitivity that for all i, X ∼ˆ πi(X).I n p a r t i c u l a r ,
X ∼ Y.
Case 2. For all i, j,P (Si ∩ S 
j) is a rational number. Let N be a common denominator
of all these fractions. Random variables X and Y can now be written as in Case 1 with
equiprobable events T1     TN.
Case 3. There exist i and j,s u c ht h a tP (Si ∩ S 
j) is irrational. Any random variable
Z = (z1 T1;   ;zn Tn) is the limit of Zk = (zk
1 Tk
1 ;   ;zk
2k Tk
2k), where for all k and  ,
P(zk
 ) = 2−k. This case follows by continuity from Case 2.  
Proof of Lemma 1.L e t R and R  be two regret lotteries. As usual, R dominates R  by
FOSD if and only if there is a list of probabilities p1     pn adding up to 1 such that
R = (r1 p1;   ;rn pn) and R  = (r 
1 p1;   ;r 
n pn),a n df o ra l li, ri ≥ r 
i.
From the continuity of ψ, we know that for every r ∈[
¯
r  ¯ r] there exist x y ∈[
¯
x  ¯ x] such
that r = ψ(x y). Hence there are X Y ∈ L such that  (X Y) = R. By the continuity and
monotonicity of ψ,w ec a nﬁ n dX  and Y  such that x 
i ≤ xi, y 
i ≥ yi, ψ(x 
i y 
i) = r 
i for each
i,a n d (X  Y ) = R .E i t h e rX strictly dominates X  by FOSD or Y  strictly dominates
Y by FOSD (or both). Monotonicity of   implies that X   X  and Y    Y with at least
one of these preferences being strict.
(i) If V( R ) = 0,t h e nX ∼ Y. By transitivity, X  ≺ Y  and hence V( R  ) =
V(   ( X   Y )) < 0.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Transitive regret 103
(ii) If V( R  ) = 0,t h e nX  ∼ Y . By transitivity, X   Y and, therefore, V( R )=
V(   ( X  Y) )>0.  
Proof of Lemma 2.( i )L e tS1 and S2 be two disjoint events, where P(S1) = P(S2) =
0 5. Deﬁne the lotteries X = (x S1;y S2), Y = (y S1;x S2), X  = (x  S1;y  S2),a n d
Y  = (y  S1;x  S2).L e tr = ψ(x y) = ψ(x  y ).T h e n
 (X Y) = (r 0 5;ψ(y x) 0 5)
 (X  Y ) = (r 0 5;ψ(y  x ) 0 5) 
By Proposition 1, X ∼ Y and X  ∼ Y ; thus, we have V(   ( X  Y) )= V(   ( X   Y )) = 0.
But if ψ(y x)  = ψ(y  x ),t h e n (X Y) either dominates or is dominated by  (X  Y ),
contradicting Lemma 1.
(ii) Recall that ψ(x x) = 0.L e tf :[
¯
r  ¯ r]→[ −¯ r  ¯ r] be deﬁned as
f(r)=
 
−ψ(y x) if r<0 and x<yis such that ψ(x y) = r
r if r ≥ 0.
By the ﬁrst part of this lemma, the value of f(r)for r<0 does not depend on the choice
of x y in the above deﬁnition; hence f is well deﬁned. Monotonicity of ψ implies that f
is strictly increasing. We can, therefore, deﬁne




ψ(x y) if x ≥ y
f(ψ(x y)) if x<y.
Now
X   Y ⇐⇒ V(   ( X  Y) )≥ V(   ( Y  X) )
⇐⇒ V ∗( ∗(X Y)) ≥ V ∗( ∗(Y X)) 
where  ∗(X Y) is obtained from  (X Y) by replacing ψ(x y) with ψ∗(x y).  
Proof of Lemma 3. In the sequel, random variables Q with m (not necessarily dis-
tinct) outcomes are of the form (q1 Sm
1 ;   ;qm Sm
m) for some canonical partition where
P(Sm
i ) = 1/m, i = 1     m.F o rQ and Q  with m outcomes each, let
 Q Q  =(q1 S2m
1 ;   ;qm S2m
m ;q 
1 S2m




i ) = 1/(2m).
Let R and R  be generated by permutations π of X = (x1 S1;   ;xn Sn) and π  of
Y = (y1 S 
1;   ;yn S 
n), respectively, where P(Si) = P(S 
i) = 1/n, i = 1     n.T h a t i s ,
R =  (X π(X)) and R  =  (Y π (Y)). (The assumption that X and Y are of the same104 Bikhchandani and Segal Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)




π(i) if i ≤ n
π (i −n)+n if i>n
to obtain  (Z π∗(Z)) =  ( X Y  π∗ X Y ) = 1
2R+ 1
2R .  
Proof of Lemma 4. All random variables in this proof have n outcomes on the
equiprobable events S1     Sn.F o rZ = (z1 S1;   ;zn Sn) and Z  = (z 
1 S1;   ;z 
n Sn),
deﬁne  Z −Z  =maxi|zi −z 
i|.
The proof follows from Claims 1 and 2.
Claim 1. Let X ∼ Y. For any δ>0, there exist Z1     Zk such that X = Z1 ∼···∼
Zk = Y and  Z −1 −Z  ≤δ,   = 2     k.
Proof. We construct the sequence Z1    inductively. Suppose that X  = Y and that we
have already deﬁned X = Z1 ∼···∼Z  such that  Zi−1 −Zi ≤δ, i = 2      .I fZ  = Y,
we are through. Otherwise, deﬁne L 
+ ={ i:z 
i >y i} and L 
− ={ i:z 
i <y i}.A sZ  ∼ Y and
Z   = Y, both L 
+ and L 













Deﬁne f (θ) such that Z  ∼ Z +1(θ) ≡ (z +1
1 (θ) S1;   ;z +1







i −θ if i ∈ L 
+
z 




By continuity and monotonicity of  , f (θ) is well deﬁned (for small θ), continuous, and
increasing. Its inverse exists and is continuous. Deﬁne θ  = min{δ δ 
+ f−1
  (δ 
−)} and let
Z +1 = Z +1(θ ). Note that Z1     Z +1 satisfy the hypothesis of the claim.
If θ  = δ,t h e n Z +1 − Y ≤  Z  − Y −δ.I f θ  = δ 
+,t h e n|L +1
+ |≤| L 
+|−1.I f
θ  = f−1
  (δ 
−),t h e n|L +1
− |≤| L 
−|−1. Thus, this process terminates in a ﬁnite number of
steps with Zk = Y.  
Claim2. There exists εn > 0 such that if for all i, |ri| <ε n, then there exist a random vari-
able ˆ Z and a permutation π such that R = (r1 1/n;   ;rn 1/n)satisﬁes R =  ( ˆ Z π( ˆ Z)).
Proof. The domain of outcomes is [
¯

















¯ x− ˆ z1
n
> 0 Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Transitive regret 105
Thus, ˆ z1 +nδn = ¯ x and ˆ z1 −nδn =
¯
x.
The function ψ is continuous on the compact segment [
¯
x  ¯ x]; therefore, for any
δn > 0,ther eex i s tsεn > 0 suchthat |ψ(x y)| <ε n implies |x−y| <δ n.T h u s ,w i t h|ri| <ε n
we can construct ˆ Z such that
S1 S2 S3 S4 ··· Sn−1 Sn
ˆ Z ˆ z1 ˆ z2 ˆ z3 ˆ z4 ··· ˆ zn−1 ˆ zn
π( ˆ Z) ˆ z2 ˆ z3 ˆ z4 ˆ z5 ··· ˆ zn ˆ z1
 ( ˆ Z π( ˆ Z)) r1 r2 r3 r4 ··· rn−1 ψ(ˆ zn  ˆ z1)
Outcome ˆ z1 is chosen to be the midpoint between
¯
x and ¯ x,a n de a c hˆ z +1 is cho-
sen so that ψ(ˆ z   ˆ z +1) = r ,   = 1 2     n− 1.A s|r | <ε n,w eh a v e|ˆ z  − ˆ z +1| <δ n and
each ˆ z  ∈[
¯
x  ¯ x].A s V( R )= V(   (ˆ Z π( ˆ Z))) = 0,i tm u s tb et h a tψ(ˆ zn  ˆ z1) = rn.O t h e r -
wise, R either dominates or is dominated by  ( ˆ Z π( ˆ Z)), contradicting Lemma 1.T h u s ,
R =  ( ˆ Z π( ˆ Z)).  
This completes the proof of Lemma 4.  
Proof of Lemma 5.F o rR = (r1 1/n;   ;rn 1/n) and R  = (r 
1 1/n;   ;r 
n 1/n) such
that ψ(R) = ψ(R ) = 0,l e tX, Y, X , Y  be such that  (X Y) = R and  (X  Y ) = R .
By Lemma 4, there exist sequences X = Z1 ∼···∼Zk = Y and X  = Z 
1 ∼···∼Z 
k = Y 
such that for all   = 1     k− 1 there exist ˆ Z  π   ˆ Z 
  π 
  satisfying  ( ˆ Z  π ( ˆ Z )) =
 (Z  Z +1) and  ( ˆ Z 
  π 
 ( ˆ Z 
 )) =  (Z 
  Z 
 +1).6 Thus, for each   = 1 2     k− 1,t h e
pair of regret lotteries  (Z  Z +1) and  (Z 
  Z 





2 (Z  Z +1)+ 1
2 (Z 





2 (Z  Z +1) + 1
2 (Z 
  Z 
 +1) =  ( Z  Z 
    Z +1 Z 
 +1 ),w h e r e · ·  is de-
ﬁned in the proof of Lemma 3. Consequently,
 X X  =  Z1 Z 
1 ∼···∼ Zk Z 








 ( X X    Y Y  ) = 1
2R+ 1
2R 
and we obtain V(1
2R+ 1
2R ) = 0.
As each X ∈ L is the limit of a sequence {Xk}, where for each k, Xk = (xk
1 1/nk;   ;
xk
nk 1/nk), the lemma now follows by continuity for all R and R  such that V( R )=
V( R  ) = 0.  
6We use the same k in both sequences without loss of generality, as the sequences may become station-
ary from a certain point on.106 Bikhchandani and Segal Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
Proof of Lemma 6.R e c a l lt h a tV( δ ¯ r)>0 >V( δ −¯ r),w h e r eδt is the constant lottery
yielding t.
(i) For a regret lottery R such that V( R )>0,l e tα(R) be deﬁned by V( α ( R ) R+
(1 − α(R))δ−¯ r) = 0, and for R such that V( R )<0,l e tα(R) be deﬁned by V( α ( R ) R+
(1 − α(R))δ¯ r) = 0.B y Lemma 1 and the continuity of V , α(R) is well deﬁned and
α(R) < 1.L e tα∗ satisfy V( α ∗δ¯ r +(1−α∗)δ−¯ r) = 0.
We show ﬁrst that α is a continuous function. Let Rk → R0 and suppose that
α(Rk) → α .7 Suppose without loss of generality that for all k, V( R k) ≥ 0. By the conti-
nuity of V ,











⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
α∗
α(R)
−α∗ if V( R )>0




if V( R )<0.
For R such that V( R ) = 0, α(R) < 1;h e n c eU(R)  0 if and only if V( R )  0.T h e
continuity of α(·) implies that U(R)is continuous. We show next that U is linear. That
is, for all R and R , U(1
2R+ 1
2R ) = 1
2U(R)+ 1
2U(R ).
By Lemma 5 and the continuity of V we have the following conclusion.
Conclusion 1. IfV( R )= V( R  ) = 0,t h e nf o ra l lα ∈[ 0 1], V( α R+(1−α)R ) = 0.
For arbitrary regret lotteries R and R , consider the three dimensional simplex   of
lotteries over R, R , δ¯ r, δ−¯ r. Take a linear transformation K of   such that K(δ−¯ r) =
(0 0 −1), K(δ¯ r) = (0 0 (1−α∗/α∗)), K(R) = (x∗ y∗ z∗), K(R ) = (x  y  z ),a n d ,b y
Conclusion 1, V( x  y z )= 0 if and only if z = 0. It follows that for z>0, α(x y z) solves
αz −(1−α) = 0  ⇒ α(x y z) =
1
z +1
and for z<0, α(x y z) solves
αz +(1−α)
1−α∗




In both cases, U(x y z)= α∗z.
Deﬁne now a preference relation  ∗ on regret lotteries by R  ∗ R  if and only if
U(R)≥ U(R ). Since U is continuous, so is  ∗, and since U is linear,  ∗ satisﬁes the
independence axiom. Therefore, there is a function v such that U(R)  0 if and only if
E[v(R)]   0. The lemma follows since U(R)  0 if and only if V( R )  0.
7If α(Rk) does not have a limit, then we take a subsequence that has a limit.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Transitive regret 107
(ii) Suppose that v(·) is not strictly increasing. Then there exists r1 <r 2 such that
v(r1) ≥ v(r2).T a k eR = (r1 p1;r2 p2;   ;rn pn) such that V( R )= 0. The continuity of V
implies that such an R exists. Construct R  = (r1 p1 − ε;r2 p2 + ε;   ;rn pn). Clearly
R  dominates R by FOSD, but 0 = V( R )≥ V( R  ), contradicting Lemma 1.T h ef a c tt h a t
v(0) = 0 follows from V( 0 1) = 0.
Finally, let S1 and S2 be two disjoint events where P(S1) = P(S2) = 0 5.D e ﬁ n e
X = (x S1;y S2) and Y ≡ (y S1;x S2).B y Proposition 1, X ∼ Y.T h u s v(ψ(x y)) =
−v(ψ(y x)).  
Proof of Lemma 7. The following claim follows from a theorem in Aczèl (1966) and is
mentioned, without an explicit proof, in Sugden (2004, p. 739).
Claim 3. If G(x y) + G(y z) = G(x z) for all x<y<z , then there exists a function
g: → such that G(x y) = g(x)−g(y).





G(x y) if x<y
0 if x = y
−G(y x) if x>y.
It may be veriﬁed that for all x, y, z,
H(x y)+H(y z)= H(x z) 
Therefore, Aczèl (1966, Theorem 1, p. 223) implies that there exists g: → such that
H(x y)= g(x)−g(y).  
Select x1 <x 2 <x 3 andp q > 0, p  = q, p+q<1
3. DeﬁnelotteriesX andY asfollows:





X x1 x2 x3 x1 x2 x3 x1 x2 x3
Y x3 x1 x2 x2 x3 x1 x1 x2 x3
Proposition 1 implies X ∼ Y, as each of these lotteries gives x1, x2,a n dx3 with
probability 1
3 each. Thus, V(   ( X  Y) )= 0 and, by Lemma 6,E [v( (X Y))]=0.A s
v(ψ(x y)) =− v(ψ(y x)) and v(ψ(x x)) = 0 (see Lemma 6), it follows that
[q −p]v(ψ(x1 x2))+[q −p]v(ψ(x2 x3))+[p−q]v(ψ(x1 x3)) = 0 
Since p  = q, we obtain for all x1 <x 2 <x 3, v(ψ(x1 x2)) + v(ψ(x2 x3)) = v(ψ(x1 x3)).
By Claim 3, there exists a function u: → such that v(ψ(x1 x2)) = u(x1) − u(x2).
Monotonicity of u follows from the monotonicity of  .  108 Bikhchandani and Segal Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
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